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DATA ROAMING REGULATION: THE 
COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE STANDARD 
AND ITS INCREASING NEED FOR CLARITY 
Lucas Childers* 
The advent of mobile broadband services (such as fourth generation, or 
“4G” technology) altered how Americans consume information by allowing 
them to access data with dramatically enhanced speed and mobility.1 Today, it 
is possible to download over forty high-definition movies in a single second 
using advanced broadband technology.2 Music and film are effortlessly down-
loaded in every corner of the country on devices slightly larger than a deck of 
playing cards.3 Mobile service providers (AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, Verizon, 
etc.) require broadband access to attract and retain customers.4 However, pro-
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 1 See, e.g., In the Matter of Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial 
Mobile Radio Service Providers and Other Providers of Mobile Data Services, Second Re-
port and Order, WT Docket No. 05-265, 26 FCC Rcd 5411, para. 1 (Apr. 7, 2011) (aff’d sub 
nom. Cellco P’ship v. FCC, 700 F.3d 534, 537 (D.C. Cir. 2012)) [hereinafter 2011 Data 
Roaming Order]; see also In the Matter of Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broad-
band Access to the Internet over Wireless Networks, Declaratory Ruling, WT Docket No. 
07-53, 22 FCC Rcd 5901, para. 11 (Mar. 22, 2007) (discussing Wireless Broadband Internet 
access and the use of spectrum to deliver high speed mobile Internet capabilities). 
 2 See David Lee, ‘Fastest Ever’ Broadband Passes Speed Test, BBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 
2014, 8:48 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-25840502 (“Speeds of 1.4 terabits 
per second…enough to send 44 uncompressed HD films a second.”). 
 3 See, e.g., Coverage Locator, VERIZON WIRELESS, 
http://vzwmap.verizonwireless.com/dotcom/coveragelocator/default.aspx?requestfrom=web
agent (last visited Feb. 14, 2015) (showing the domestic range of Verizon’s 4G LTE data 
coverage); see also Coverage Check, SPRINT, http://coverage.sprint.com/IMPACT.jsp? (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2015) (showing the domestic range of Sprint SparkTM, Sprint 4G LTE, and 
Sprint 3G data coverage). 
 4 See, e.g., In re Petition for Expedited Declaratory Ruling Filed by T-Mobile USA, 
Inc. Regarding Data Roaming Obligations, Reply Comments of Competitive Carrier Associ-
ation, WT Docket No. 05-265, 3 (Aug. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Reply Comments of Competi-
tive Carrier Association] 
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viders are finding it increasingly difficult to secure data roaming agreements in 
areas where their own network does not reach.5 The competitive disadvantage 
to providers that fail to secure data roaming agreements for mobile broadband 
services will grow in the near future, as roaming revenue is expected to in-
crease from $57 billion in 2014 to $90 billion in 2018.6 
Healthy competition in the mobile industry is at risk because of the exorbi-
tantly high rates providers must pay for data roaming agreements.7 The Federal 
Communications Commission (“Commission” or “FCC”) tried and failed to 
address the problem in the 2011 Second Report and Order in the Reexamina-
tion of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers 
and Other Providers of Mobile Data Services (“Data Roaming Order”).8 
The Data Roaming Order is ineffective because it merely requires providers 
to offer rates at a “commercially reasonable” standard.9 Because the criteria 
that define the commercially reasonable standard in the Data Roaming Order 
are too ambiguous to guarantee fair agreements, the largest mobile service 
                                                                                                             
The ability to procure commercially reasonable roaming agreements is essential to facilita-
tion of the provision of competitive wireless services, which consumers now expect will 
include nationwide coverage and seamless data services. Thus, without data roaming, non-
nationwide carriers, particularly those that serve rural areas, will struggle to compete, espe-
cially in a consolidating market. 
Id. 
 5 2011 Data Roaming Order, 26 FCC Rcd 5411, paras. 14-15. Cincinnati Bell attests 
that it has lost a significant number of customers to national carriers, despite providing supe-
rior service in the regional coverage area. According to Cincinnati Bell, customers defected 
because of Cincinnati Bell’s inability to reach a fair agreement for data roaming with pro-
viders outside the region. See, e.g., id. at para. 15. 
 6 See Nitin Bhas, Press Release: Mobile Roaming to Represent 8% of Global Operator 
Billed Service Revenues by 2018, JUNIPER RES. (Mar. 4, 2014), 
http://www.juniperresearch.com/viewpressrelease.php?pr=432. 
 7 See generally 2011 Data Roaming Order, 26 FCC Rcd 5411, para. 9 (stating the in-
tent of the Commission to increase competition within the Mobile industry); see also Letter 
from Caressa D. Bennett, Rural Wireless Ass’n, Gen. Counsel, to The Honorable Fred Up-
ton and The Honorable Greg Walden, U.S H. Rep., Comments of the Rural Wireless Ass’n, 
Inc. in response to White paper #2: Modernizing U.S. Spectrum Policy, (Apr. 25, 2014) 
(Electronically filed via Email). 
 8 2011 Data Roaming Order, 26 FCC Rcd 5411, 5485 (statement of Commissioner 
Clyburn). 
 9 See, e.g., In re Petition for Expedited Declaratory Ruling of T-Mobile USA, Inc., 
Comments of NTCA – The Rural Broadband Association, WT Docket No. 05-265, 6 (July 
10, 2014) [hereinafter Comments of NTCA] 
The Data Roaming Order sought to address inequities in the data roaming market-
place by requiring facilities-based providers of commercial mobile data services to 
offer data roaming arrangements to other providers of such services on ‘commercial-
ly reasonable terms and conditions’. . . . Greater clarity as to the meaning of ‘com-
mercially reasonable’ in the context of data roaming is needed. 
Id. 
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providers continue to offer smaller mobile service providers data roaming 
agreements at inflated rates.10 In an effort to mitigate this dilemma, T-Mobile 
recently proposed applying benchmarks, based on prices of other industry ser-
vices, to the FCC evaluation of the commercially reasonable standard.11 The 
benchmarks attempt to define the non-binding limits of the commercially rea-
sonable standard.12 The FCC should utilize the T-Mobile benchmarks to clarify 
the commercially reasonable standard, because the current definition fails to 
promote the competitive goals set forth in the 2011 Data Roaming Order.13 
Part I of this Comment introduces data roaming and provides a brief back-
ground of the industry dynamics that create obstacles to healthy competition 
among mobile service providers. Part II explains how roaming obligations 
evolve over time, and how the current regime has a negative effect on the mo-
bile industry. Part II concludes by reviewing the issues resulting from the 2007 
Order and why they still linger today. Part III argues that the FCC has estab-
lished authority to meaningfully clarify the commercially reasonable standard. 
The D.C. Circuit Court affirmed this authority and outlined how to clarify rules 
without overstepping statutory authority.14 Part IV evaluates T-Mobile’s rec-
ommended “benchmarks” meant to give carriers guidance as to what negotiat-
ed terms are “commercially reasonable.” Part V gives a brief update of data 
roaming regulations in light of the FCC’s Net Neutrality Order.15 
I. DATA ROAMING IN CONTEXT 
Commercial mobile radio service (“CMRS”) is any mobile service provided 
for profit and available to the public.16 CMRS carriers, or “providers,” like 
                                                
 10 See, e.g., id.; In the Matter of Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial 
Mobile Radio Service Providers and Other Providers of Mobile Data Services, Petition For 
Expedited Declaratory Ruling Of T-Mobile USA, Inc., WT Docket No. 05-265, 6 (May 27, 
2014) [hereinafter T-Mobile Data Roaming Petition]. 
 11 See generally T-Mobile Data Roaming Petition, WT Docket No. 05-265, 11. 
 12 See generally id. (explaining four benchmarks for the Commission to consider when 
providing guidance on the commercially reasonable standard). 
 13 See, e.g., Comments of NTCA, WT Docket No. 05-265, 5-6 (stating NTCA’s support 
of the suggested four industry benchmarks); see T-Mobile Data Roaming Petition WT 
Docket No. 05-265, 6 (explaining that despite the adoption of the 2011 Data Roaming Or-
der, problems with discriminatory data roaming agreements still remain prevalent). 
 14 See generally Cellco Partnership v. FCC, 700 F.3d 534 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 15 See In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order 
on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, GN Docket No. 14-28 (Feb. 26, 2015) (“Net 
Neutrality Order”). 
 16 See 47 C.F.R. § 20.3 (2013).  “Commercial mobile radio service” is defined as: 
A mobile service that is: (a)(1) provided for profit, i.e., with the intent of receiving 
compensation or monetary gain; (2) An interconnected service; and (3) Available to 
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Sprint or Verizon, allow subscribers to access mobile services through the use 
of devices such as cell phones.17  Voice telephony service (phone calls), short 
message service (“SMS” or “text messaging”), and push-to-talk services are all 
examples of CMRS.18 
Roaming service, or “roaming,” occurs when the subscriber of one CMRS 
carrier uses the facilities of a wholly unrelated CMRS carrier to initiate, re-
ceive, or continue a voice call or other commercial mobile service.19 When 
roaming, the subscriber’s own CMRS carrier is known as the “requesting pro-
vider,”20 while the carrier whose facilities are being used by the requesting pro-
vider, is known as the “host provider.”21 
Large carriers have little incentive to forge roaming agreements with small, 
regional carriers.22 Accordingly, smaller carriers often struggle to negotiate 
data roaming agreements with the two largest facilities-based carriers23: AT&T 
                                                                                                             
the public, or to such classes of eligible users as to be effectively available to a sub-
stantial portion of the public; or (b) The 
functional equivalent of such a mobile service described in paragraph (a) of this sec-
tion 47 C.F.R. § 20.3 (2013). 
Id.; see also id. (defining “Commercial mobile data service” as “(1) Any mobile data service 
that is not interconnected with the public switched network and is: (i) Provided for profit; 
and (ii) available to the public or to such classes of eligible users as to be effectively availa-
ble to the public”). 
 17 See, e.g., Activate Your Verizon Wireless Device and Explore Plans in a Few Easy 
Steps, VERIZON, http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/nso/enterDeviceId.do?&zipRdr=y 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2015) (illustrating the various devices that can be connected to the 
Verizon mobile and wireless services). 
 18 See In the Matter of Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile 
Radio Service Providers and Other Providers of Mobile Data Services, Report and Order 
and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, WT Docket No. 05-265, 22 FCC Rcd 15817, 
paras. 54-55 (Aug. 7, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Data Roaming Order]. 
 19 See id. at para. 5, 6 
There are two forms of roaming – manual and automatic. With manual roaming, the 
subscriber must establish a relationship with the host carrier on whose system he or 
she wants to roam in order to make a call. Typically, the roaming subscriber accom-
plishes this in the course of attempting to originate a call by giving a valid credit 
card number to the carrier providing the roaming service. By contrast, with automat-
ic roaming, the roaming subscriber is able to originate or terminate a call without 
taking any special actions. Automatic roaming requires a pre-existing contractual 
agreement between the subscriber’s home system and the host system. 
Id. 
 20 Roaming for Mobile Wireless Services, FCC, 
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/roaming-mobile-wireless-services (last visited Feb. 14, 
2015). 
 21 See 2007 Data Roaming Order, 22 FCC Rcd 15817, para. 2. 
 22 See id. at para. 28 (“[I]t is getting more difficult for small and rural carriers to obtain 
access to nationwide carriers’ networks through automatic roaming agreements.”). 
 23 Reply Comments of Competitive Carrier Association, WT Docket No. 05-265, at 2. 
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and Verizon.24 Small and regional carriers depend on roaming agreements with 
large carriers to ensure consumers will have nationwide access outside their 
coverage area.25 National carriers often already have infrastructure in areas 
where regional carriers build out their networks, so they often have little to 
gain by providing roaming service.26 
According to the FCC, consolidation of the mobile marketplace has made it 
increasingly challenging for regional carriers to obtain fair data roaming 
agreements.27 Major carriers have the resources to acquire or construct the in-
frastructure needed to support nationwide service to consumers.28  Because 
large carriers possess their own equipment across the country,29 they lack the 
incentive to enter reciprocal agreements with regional carriers, who may have 
previously had the only comprehensive network in a given coverage area.30 The 
continuous expansion of major carriers’ networks has driven a significant 
number of smaller providers out of business.31 When large carriers can meet 
their roaming needs by only dealing with one another, smaller providers are 
priced out of the market because developing infrastructure is so costly.32 
                                                
 24 See 2011 Data Roaming Order, 26 FCC Rcd. 5411, paras. 25-26 (Apr. 7, 2011) (stat-
ing the difficulties in reaching negotiation agreements with both Verizon and AT&T). Per-
haps preempting the Commission’s response to this dynamic, a suspicious number of data 
roaming agreements were reached in the months preceding the release of the Data Roaming 
Order. Id. at para. 27. The Commission acknowledged the disparity, noting that the sponta-
neous cooperation “may not accurately reflect the ability of requesting providers to obtain 
data roaming arrangements in the future.” Id. 
 25 Id. at para. 15. 
 26 See id. at paras. 25-26 (stating that large carriers have refused to enter into negotia-
tions with small carriers that will not expand the already existing carrier coverage of the 
large carrier). 
 27 Id. at para. 27. 
 28 See, e.g., id. (describing the Commission’s opinion that AT&T and Verizon would 
likely not offer roaming arrangements with smaller carriers for the newest “Long Term Evo-
lution networks”). 
 29 See id. (“We also note that AT&T and Verizon Wireless are only now deploying 
‘fourth generation’ Long Term Evolution networks.”). 
 30 See id. (stating that the large carriers may halt any roaming negotiations for “ad-
vanced mobile data networks” due to the extent of coverage enjoyed by these carriers). 
 31 See id. at 5485 (statement of Commissioner Mignon L. Clyburn). 
 32 Ibkis, Regional Wireless Carriers Love the New Data Roaming Mandate, TAO OF 
IBKIS (Apr. 13, 2011), http://taoofibkis.blogspot.com/2011/04/regional-wireless-carriers-
love-new.html. 
2015] Data Roaming Regulation 507 
II. EVOLUTION OF ROAMING REQUIREMENTS HAS RESULTED IN 
COMPLEX AND PROBLEMATIC CLASSIFICATIONS OF MOBILE 
SERVICES 
One major impetus for establishing a data roaming rule is that it benefits 
consumers by fostering competition.33 A significant barrier to entry for poten-
tial cell service providers, or CMRS carriers, is the ability to secure data roam-
ing agreements for areas that will not be covered by the potential carrier’s net-
work.34 Consumers expect nationwide service,35 and if regional carriers are un-
able to provide this coverage through roaming agreements, it becomes very 
difficult to attract customers or maintain viability in the mobile marketplace.36 
After years of consideration, the Commission finally extended roaming ob-
ligations to mobile data services in the Data Roaming Order, published in 
2011.37  But the Data Roaming Order does not go far enough because it only 
obligates carriers to offer data roaming service on “commercially reasonable” 
terms.38 This is problematic because the “commercially reasonable” standard is 
judged according to sixteen explicit criteria, in addition to the “the totality of 
the circumstances.”39 The factors range from subjective judgments like “the 
                                                
 33 2011 Data Roaming Order, 26 FCC Rcd. 5411, para. 31. 
 34 See, e.g., id. at para. 19 (citing Bright House Network’s contention that data roaming 
agreement requirements would be key to barrier removal). 
 35 See, e.g., id. at para. 15 (“[C]onsumers expect to be able to have access to the full 
range of services available on their devices wherever they go.”); see Reply Comments of 
Competitive Carrier Association, WT Docket No. 05-265, at 3 (on competitive wireless 
services: “consumers now expect will include nationwide coverage and seamless data ser-
vices”). 
 36 See, e.g., In re Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio 
Service Providers and Other Providers of Mobile Data Services, Comments of Limitless 
Mobile, LLC., WT Docket No. 05-265, at 2 (filed July 10, 2014) 
American consumers have come to expect that all retail wireless carriers offer voice 
and data rate plans with nationwide coverage. For a facilities-based carrier like Lim-
itless, this expectation means that its own nationwide, retail service offering must 
consist of some combination of local coverage (provided on-network) and roaming 
partner coverage. Because Limitless is a local mobile wireless service provider with 
a modest licensed footprint in just one state, it relies upon AT&T and T-Mobile 
(which operate similar GSM-based networks) as absolutely crucial nationwide roam-
ing partners. Limitless depends upon these two carriers to supplement its local cov-
erage so that Limitless may offer truly nationwide retail plans that are even remotely 
competitive with the retail rates and plans offered by the nationwide carriers. 
Id. 
 37 2011 Data Roaming Order, 26 FCC Rcd. 5411, para. 1. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See id. at paras. 85-86 
In addition to others, the Commission will take into account the following enumerat-
ed factors: whether the host provider has responded to the request for negotiation, 
whether it has engaged in a persistent pattern of stonewalling behavior, and the 
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level of competitive harm in a given market and the benefits to consumers,” to 
objective measurements such as “the propagation characteristics of the spec-
trum licensed to the providers.”40  However, the Data Roaming Order is vitally 
flawed because it fails to explain how the factors will be weighed relative to 
each other or even how they will be interpreted individually. What level of 
competitive harm is acceptable? How important is competitive harm in relation 
to spectrum propagation characteristics? Without any intelligible guidance, 
carriers cannot know if an agreement is in violation of the Data Roaming Or-
der.41 In the three years since the Data Roaming Order was released, the com-
mercially reasonable standard has had little to no impact on the anti-
competitive concerns it was intended to address.42 
                                                                                                             
length of time since the initial request; whether the terms and conditions offered by 
the host provider are so unreasonable as to be tantamount to a refusal to offer a data 
roaming arrangement; whether the parties have any roaming arrangements with each 
other, including roaming for interconnected services such as voice, and the terms of 
such arrangements; whether the providers involved have had previous data roaming 
arrangements with similar terms; the level of competitive harm in a given market 
and the benefits to consumers; the extent and nature of providers’ build-out; signifi-
cant economic factors, such as whether building another network in the geographic 
area may be economically infeasible or unrealistic, and the impact of any “head-
start” advantages; whether the requesting provider is seeking data roaming for an ar-
ea where it is already providing facilities-based service; the impact of the terms and 
conditions on the incentives for either provider to invest in facilities and coverage, 
services, and service quality; whether there are other options for securing a data 
roaming arrangement in the areas subject to negotiations and whether alternative da-
ta roaming partners are available; events or circumstances beyond either provider’s 
control that impact either the provision of data roaming or the need for data roaming 
in the proposed area(s) of coverage; the propagation characteristics of the spectrum 
licensed to the providers; whether a host provider’s decision not to offer a data roam-
ing arrangement is reasonably based on the fact that the providers are not technolog-
ically compatible; whether a host provider’s decision not to enter into a roaming ar-
rangement is reasonably based on the fact that roaming is not technically feasible for 
the service for which it is requested; whether a host provider’s decision not to enter 
into a roaming arrangement is reasonably based on the fact that changes to the host 
network necessary to accommodate the request are not economically reasonable; 
whether a host provider’s decision not to make a roaming arrangement effective was 
reasonably based on the fact that the requesting provider’s provision of mobile data 
service to its own subscribers has not been done with a generation of wireless tech-
nology comparable to the technology on which the requesting provider seeks to 
roam; other special or extenuating circumstances. 
Id. 
 40 See id. at para. 86. 
 41 See, e.g., id. (showing a lack of this information present in the listed factors). 
 42 See, e.g., T-Mobile Data Roaming Petition, WT Docket No. 05-265, at 1 (filed May 
27, 2014) (providing an example of the ongoing need for guidance on the “commercially 
reasonable” standard); see also In re Petition for Expedited Declaratory Ruling Filed by T-
Mobile USA, Inc. Regarding Data Roaming Obligations, Reply Comments of Competitive 
Carrier Association, WT Docket No. 05-265 at 1. 
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A. The 2007 Order Imposes First Automatic Roaming Requirement on Voice 
Telephony Service 
The Commission adopted roaming requirements for the first time in 1981.43 
It followed with additional orders in 1996,44 200045 and 2007.46 The 2007 Order 
is significant because it extended automatic47 roaming requirements to phone 
calls, text messaging, and push-to-talk services.48 This allowed consumers to 
use voice, text, and push-to-talk services on other providers’ networks as if 
they were using their own carrier’s network.49 
While developing the 2007 Order, the Commission contemplated extending 
the automatic roaming requirements to “non-interconnected data services” 
such as mobile broadband Internet access.50 When the proposal was met with 
strong opposition from mobile carriers,51 the Commission concluded that it was 
premature to extend roaming requirements to non-interconnected data ser-
vices.52 Although broadband services were exempt in the 2007 Order, the in-
creased importance of data roaming spurred the Commission to release a Fur-
ther Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“FNPRM”) seeking comment as to 
whether or when automatic roaming obligations should extend to non-
                                                
 43 See In the Matter of An Inquiry Into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890 
MHz for Cellular Communications Systems; and Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of the Com-
mission’s Rules Relative to Cellular Communications Systems, Report and Order, CC Dock-
et No. 79-318, 86 FCC 2d 469, para. 75 (May 4, 1981) [hereinafter Cellular Report & Or-
der]. 
 44 In the Matter of Interconnection and Resale Obligations, Second Report and Order, 
CC Docket No. 94-54, 11 FCC Rcd. 9465, para. 1 (June 27, 1996). 
 45 In the Matter of Interconnection and Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial 
Mobile Radio Services, Third Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order on 
Reconsideration, CC Docket No. 94-54, 1515 FCC Rcd 15975, para. 22 (Aug. 28, 2000). 
 46 See 2007 Data Roaming Order, WT Docket No. 05-265, 22 FCC Rcd 15817, para. 2 
(Aug. 16, 2007). 
 47 See id. 
 48 See id. at para. 54. The 2007 Order officially applies to real-time, two-way switched 
voice and interconnected data services offered by CMRS carriers. The Commission applied 
this designation to voice calls; and although they extended the automatic roaming require-
ment to SMS and push-to-talk services, the Commission notes that nothing in the 2007 Or-
der should be construed as addressing the regulatory classification of SMS, push-to-talk, or 
other data services. Id. at paras. 2, 54-55. 
 49 See id. at para. 60. 
 50 See id. at paras. 58, 60. 
 51 See id. at para. 58 (“Of those commenters who addressed data roaming services, the 
majority oppose extending automatic roaming to data services using enhanced digital net-
works.”). 
 52 See id. at para. 60. 
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interconnected data services like mobile broadband.53 The Commission consid-
ered roaming obligations for data services numerous times after releasing the 
FNPRM,54 but it would still take nearly four years for any data roaming regula-
tions to be adopted.55 
On April 7, 2011, the FCC released the Data Roaming Order, formally 
known as the Second Report and Order: In the Matter of Reexamination of 
Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers and 
Other Providers of Mobile Data Services.56 The primary objective of the Data 
Roaming Order is to promote expansion of nationwide mobile broadband ser-
vice by requiring facilities-based providers of commercial mobile data services 
to offer commercially reasonable data roaming arrangements to other provid-
ers.57 
B. Obligations Imposed by the Commercially Reasonable Standard 
In the Data Roaming Order, the Commission expands the scope of roaming 
obligations to include mobile data services.58 After reviewing public comments 
the Commission concluded that requiring facilities-based providers to offer 
commercially reasonable agreements was in the public interest.59 Specifically, 
the FCC found that imposing data roaming regulations benefits the public 
through increased investment, which promotes competition among providers 
and expands access to mobile broadband services for millions of Americans.60 
                                                
 53 See id. at para. 77. 
 54 See 2011 Data Roaming Order, 26 FCC Rcd 5411, para. 5 (citing In the Matter of 
Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers and 
Other Providers of Mobile Data Services, Order on Reconsideration and Second Further 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, WT Docket No. 05-265, 25 FCC Rcd 4181, para. 18 (Apr. 
21, 2010)). 
 55 See id. at para. 1. 
 56 See id. at paras. 1-3. 
 57 See id. at para. 1. 
 58 The 2007 Order only applied to “real-time, two-way switched voice or data services . 
. . that are interconnected with the public switched network,” but the simultaneously re-
leased Further Notice contemplated a more general automatic data roaming obligation that 
covers interconnected and non-interconnected data. See 2007 Data Roaming Order, 22 FCC 
Rcd. 15817, para. 23. The 2010 Second Further Notice again requested comment on wheth-
er roaming obligations should extend to mobile broadband Internet access and other non-
interconnected mobile data services. See 2011 Data Roaming Order, 26 FCC Rcd 5411, 
para. 4. 
 59 2011 Data Roaming Order, 26 FCC Rcd 5411, para. 13. 
 60 See id. at paras. 29-31 (finding that adoption of the rule will benefit providers that 
serve “millions of American consumers who otherwise might not have full access to mobile 
broadband services,” as well as promote investment, deployment and competition among 
facilities-based providers). 
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However, the vague obligations imposed by the “commercially reasonable” 
standard have stymied progress toward those goals.61 
The Commission will determine whether a provider’s conduct, negotiations, 
or terms are commercially reasonable on a case-by-case basis, taking into con-
sideration the totality of the circumstances.62 More specifically, the FCC looks 
at sixteen factors63 for each individual negotiation, including whether the carri-
er engages in persistent stonewalling behavior, whether the parties had similar 
agreements in the past, and whether terms offered are “so unreasonable as to 
be tantamount to a refusal to offer a data roaming arrangement.”64 Beyond list-
ing them, the Data Roaming Order neglects to clarify how any of the factors 
are evaluated. Aside from noting that carriers may negotiate individual terms 
and prices when they “reasonably reflect actual differences in particular cas-
es,”65 the Commission’s sole remaining guidance is that “conduct that unrea-
sonably restrains trade, however, is not commercially reasonable.”66 This ex-
emplifies the issues providers face dealing with the ambiguity of the commer-
cially reasonable standard. By stating “[an] unreasonable restraint of trade is 
not commercially reasonable,” followed directly thereafter with “a difference 
in circumstance may justify a difference in terms,” the Commission leaves un-
answered whether a difference in terms not justified by a difference in circum-
stance qualifies as an unreasonable restraint of trade.67 
The Data Roaming Order lends more clarity to circumstances in which the 
host providers are exempt from offering commercially reasonable terms. There 
are four important limitations to the scope of the commercially reasonable 
standard: individualized negotiations are still allowed;68 networks must be 
                                                
 61 See, e.g., T-Mobile Data Roaming Petition, WT Docket No. 05-265, at 10 (May 27, 
2014) 
Simply put, the roaming market is dysfunctional. . . . [P]roviding greater clarity as to 
the meaning of ‘commercially reasonable’ in the limited context of data roaming . . . 
will help arm providers with the tools they need to obtain the data roaming agree-
ments necessary to enable them to compete. 
Id. 
 62 2011 Data Roaming Order, 26 FCC Rcd 5411, para. 85. 
 63 Id. at para. 86. 
 64 See id. 
 65 See id. at para. 85 
 66 See id. 
 67 See id. at paras. 45, 85. 
 68 Providers’ obligation to offer data roaming arrangements with commercially reasona-
ble terms and conditions provides an exception that allows host providers to reach individu-
alized negotiations with a requesting provider. The Commission provides that commercially 
reasonable terms offered to a requesting provider may be tailored to individual circumstanc-
es, however any conduct that “unreasonably restricts trade” is prohibited.  See id. at para. 45 
(“First, providers may negotiate the terms of their roaming agreements on an individualized 
basis.”). 
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technologically compatible;69 arrangement must be economically feasible for 
the host provider;70 and the roaming carrier must provide comparable wireless 
technology. 71   
C. Issues Continue to Plague a Majority of Providers 
Despite widespread consensus72 among mobile service providers, the ab-
stract commercially reasonable standard has yet to be clarified by the FCC 
since the release of the Data Roaming Order in 2011.73 The Commission’s in-
action has led T-Mobile to call for industry guidance due to further issues re-
garding competition and market consolidation.74 
Because of the unclear standards in the Data Roaming Order, competition in 
                                                
 69 Requesting providers are not required to have an identical air interface as the host 
provider. Rather, the requesting provider’s technology simply has to be able to communicate 
with the host provider’s network. One way technological compatibility can be overcome is 
by providing customers with multi-band devices that function on several different networks. 
See id. at para. 46 (“[I]t is commercially reasonable for providers not to offer a data roaming 
arrangement to a requesting provider that is not technologically compatible.”). 
 70 In certain circumstances, a requesting provider may be able to communicate with a 
host network, yet the host network is still unable to provide roaming for some services. In 
these circumstances, host providers are not required to offer commercially reasonable terms 
if the changes to the network necessary to accommodate such roaming are economically 
infeasible. See id. at para. 47 (stating that it is commercially reasonable for providers to 
refuse roaming agreements where necessary changes would be unreasonable economically). 
 71 This exception allows host providers to refrain from offering commercially reasona-
ble terms to a requesting provider when the requesting provider is effectively reselling the 
host provider’s roaming service in lieu of building their own networks. This situation could 
arise if a requesting provider supplied its customers with 4G-capable devices, but offered 
little or no 4G service on their own network. Here, a host provider with broad 4G coverage 
would not be obligated to offer commercially reasonable terms to the requesting provider. 
The Commission’s reasoning is that requesting providers would have incentives to enter 
roaming agreements instead of upgrading their own networks. By conditioning the effec-
tiveness of roaming agreements on the requesting provider’s ability to service a comparable 
generation of wireless technology on their own network, the Commission ensures roaming 
obligations will not deter future investment in infrastructure. Id. at para. 48. 
 72 See Reply Comments of Competitive Carriers Association, WT Docket No. 05-265, at 
14 (Aug. 20, 2014) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System). 
 73 See, e.g., T-Mobile Data Roaming Petition, WT Docket No. 05-265, at 10. 
By providing greater clarity as to the meaning of ‘commercially reasonable’ in the 
limited context of data roaming, the Commission will help arm providers with the 
tools they need to obtain the data roaming agreements necessary to enable them to 
compete. . . . Clarification will help parties better understand their data roaming 
rights and obligations, help narrow the issues in dispute in roaming negotiations, and 
allow parties to arrive at commercially reasonable terms more consistently and more 
quickly. 
Id. 
 74 See id. at i. 
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the mobile marketplace suffered because small and mid-size carriers are still 
unable to enter commercially reasonable data roaming agreements with the 
largest carriers.75  Unprecedented consolidation within the mobile service in-
dustry reduced competition and helped Verizon and AT&T further establish 
their dominance.76 The two largest mobile service providers currently account 
for sixty-seven percent of all wireless revenue, as they look to continue to gain 
shares of the market.77 The vast resources separating Verizon and AT&T from 
all other carriers minimize their incentive to offer fair or reasonable data roam-
ing rates to smaller carriers.78 By using the ambiguity of the commercially rea-
sonable standard and their respective positions of market dominance, AT&T 
and Verizon are able to strong-arm smaller carriers into disadvantageous data 
roaming arrangements because smaller carriers often depend on data roaming 
to remain operational.79 
Aside from Verizon and AT&T, commenters unanimously expressed the 
view that the current wholesale roaming market is uncompetitive.80 Some carri-
ers have reported waiting as long as eight months for an initial response to a 
data roaming request.81 The Rural Broadband Association (“NTCA”) conduct-
                                                
 75 See John Blevins, Death of the Revolution: The Legal War on Competitive Broad-
band Technologies, 12 YALE J. L. & TECH. 85, 131 (2009) 
As carriers get larger and fewer, roaming arrangements become increasingly im-
portant. At the same time, however, the data and in-market exceptions make it in-
creasingly more difficult for smaller carriers to obtain roaming agreements. The two 
forces working together—size and law—have amplified entry costs, and therefore 
limited competitive threats to incumbents. 
Id. 
 76 See Reply Comments of Competitive Carriers Association, WT Docket No. 05-265, at 
5-6; In re Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service 
Providers and Other Providers of Mobile Data Services, Comments of Rural Wireless Asso-
ciation, Inc., WT Docket No. 05-265, at 5 (July 10, 2014) (accessible via FCC Electronic 
Comment Filing System). 
 77 See T-Mobile Data Roaming Petition, WT Docket No. 05-265, at 7. 
 78 See Reply Comments of Competitive Carriers Association, WT Docket No. 05-265, at 
5-6. 
 79 See id. at 4-5. 
 80 See id. 
All commenters, aside from AT&T and Verizon, denounce the wholesale roaming 
market as uncompetitive. Several commenters describe the challenges they face in 
obtaining data roaming in regions where it is most needed, which suggests that 
AT&T and Verizon have used the ambiguity in the ‘commercially reasonable’ 
standard to impede negotiations and to preclude roaming arrangements. In other in-
stances, AT&T and Verizon have used their dominant positions as providers of na-
tionwide roaming capabilities to strong-arm small carriers into executing data roam-
ing arrangements containing commercially unreasonable terms. 
Id. 
 81 See T-Mobile Data Roaming Petition, WT Docket No. 05-265, at 6 (citing In re Mat-
ter of Petition for Expedited Declaratory Ruling Filed by T-Mobile USA, Inc. Regarding 
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ed a survey of 900 rural, independent phone companies and found that fifty-
eight percent identify data roaming negotiations as a major area of concern; 
while sixty-nine percent of respondents consider their experience of negotiat-
ing data roaming arrangements with other carriers as “moderately to extremely 
difficult.”82 Other carriers are required to prepare largely speculative long-term 
data traffic projections for their customers’ use of data roaming services, with 
substantial financial penalties imposed for deviating too far from the projec-
tions.83 Even T-Mobile, the fourth largest mobile service provider in the United 
States, could not negotiate commercially reasonable rates for wholesale data 
roaming.84 In fact, the average wholesale data roaming rate paid by T-Mobile 
in 2013 was several times greater than rates major carriers would charge their 
own retail customers, notwithstanding the traditional notion that bulk purchas-
es come at a discounted price per unit.85 
D. Issues Will Persist Until the FCC Implements Effective Regulations 
AT&T and Verizon contend that further Commission intervention into data 
roaming is unnecessary because both carriers have entered into more than thir-
ty data roaming agreements each since 2011.86 Moreover, Verizon claims that 
                                                                                                             
Data Roaming Obligations, Comments of NTCA – The Rural Broadband Association, WT 
Docket No. 05-265, at 3 (July 10, 2014) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing 
System)). 
 82 See id. at 6-7; NAT’L TELECOMM. COOP. ASS’N, NTCA 2012 WIRELESS SURVEY (Sept. 
2012), available at 
http://www.ntca.org/images/stories/Documents/Advocacy/SurveyReports/2012ntcawirelesss
urveyreport.pdf. 
 83 See T-Mobile Data Roaming Petition, WT Docket No. 05-265, at 6. 
 84 See generally id. at 20; see also Daniel B. Kine, T-Mobile Wins an FCC Battle with 
AT&T and Verizon, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Dec. 23, 2014), 
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/12/23/t-mobile-wins-an-fcc-battle-with-att-
and-verizon.aspx (stating that T-Mobile was seeking enforcement clarification from the 
FCC to determine whether specific data roaming agreements were actually commercially 
reasonable, the FCC granted this Petition by T-Mobile on December 18, 2014). 
 85 See Reply Comments of Competitive Carrier Association, WT Docket No. 05-265, at 
9, Ex. 2 to Petition at para. 86 (citing Decl. of Dr. Joseph Farrell, D.Phil) 
Finally, AT&T also disregards Dr. Farrell’s remarks accompanying the data that “the 
average domestic wholesale data roaming rate that T-Mobile paid in 2013 is 3.6 
times the maximum retail rate that Verizon charges a user of 1,700 MB per month, 
six times the rate AT&T charges, over seven times the rate that T-Mobile charges, 
and over ten times Sprint’s maximum rate. 
Id. 
 86 See In the Matter of Petition for Expedited Declaratory Ruling Filed by T-Mobile 
USA, Inc., Opposition of AT&T, WT Docket No. 05-265, at 10-11 (filed July 10, 2014) 
(accessible via FCC Electronic Filing System) [hereinafter Opposition of AT&T]. 
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data roaming prices have dropped forty percent over the same stretch of time.87 
Although data roaming prices have decreased at a consistent rate in recent 
years,88 Verizon’s statistics could take into account special agreements reached 
with small carriers, in which Verizon retains greater than normal control over 
the small carrier’s operations and the small carrier receives a discounted data 
roaming rate from Verizon.89 
Verizon and AT&T also mention that few, if any, complaints have been 
filed pursuant to the FCC’s data roaming dispute resolution procedures since 
the release of the 2011 Data Roaming Order.90 However, Competitive Carrier 
Association (CCA) explains that this is not a function of a healthy data roam-
ing marketplace.91 Rather, the lack of complaints filed with the Commission 
can be attributed to two concerns: first, there is no precedent for evaluating 
“commercially reasonable” terms, therefore aggrieved carriers lack confidence 
in the success of dispute resolution, and second, the heavy reliance on data 
roaming partners dissuades small carriers from engaging in hostile conduct.92 
Despite protests from Verizon and AT&T, there is evidence that deregula-
tion leads to market concentration and diminished competition.93 In July 2014, 
Verizon announced their plan to begin throttling users with grandfathered-in 
                                                
 87 See also In re Matter of Petition for Expedited Declaratory Ruling Filed by T-Mobile 
USA, Inc. Regarding Data Roaming Obligations, Comments of Verizon, WT Docket No. 
05-265, at 8-9 (filed July 10, 2014) (accessible via FCC Electronic Filing System). 
 88 Reply Comments of Competitive Carrier Association, WT Docket No. 05-265, at 7. 
 89 See id.; see also Brian Fung, Sprint’s Enlisting Small Carriers in its War on Verizon 
and AT&T, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2014/03/27/sprints-enlisting-small-carriers-in-its-war-on-verizon-and-att/. 
 90 Opposition of AT&T, WT Docket No. 05-265, at 10. 
 91 Reply Comments of Competitive Carrier Association, WT Docket No. 05-265, at 5-6 
(“Commenters agree with CCA’s assessment that the imbalance between the two largest 
carriers has been exacerbated by increased consolidation in the industry.”). 
 92 See id. at 10 
Furthermore, the ‘must-have’ nature of roaming partners with broader coverage nec-
essarily means that parties will be less likely to file complaints if they have no 
choice but to accept unfavorable terms. The lack of roaming complaints, thus, is not 
a useful measure of the effectiveness of the rules…[g]iven the extreme disparity in 
the negotiating positions of the two largest carriers, the exorbitant data roaming rates 
experienced by carriers commenting in this proceeding reflect the entrenched ad-
vantage that the two largest carriers hold. 
Id. 
 93 See Blevins, supra note 75, at 100 (“[T]he general concern is that the FCC’s deregu-
lation has led to increasing prices. Indeed, a recent report . . . has documented these price 
increases, concluding that prices are rising in areas that have been the most thoroughly de-
regulated (and thus theoretically most subject to competition).”); see, e.g., U.S. PUB. INST. 
RESEARCH GRP., THE FAILURE OF CABLE DEREGULATION: A BLUEPRINT FOR CREATING A 
COMPETITIVE, PRO-CONSUMER CABLE TELEVISION MARKETPLACE 55 (2003), available at 
http://www.uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/Failure_Of_Cable_Deregulation_USPIRG.pdf 
(discussing the concentration of the cable industry as a result of deregulation). 
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unlimited data plans on October 1, 2014, and justified the policy with dubious 
technical concerns.94 FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler contacted Verizon express-
ing his frustration, saying in part: 
Reasonable network management concerns the technical management of your net-
work; it is not a loophole designed to enhance your revenue streams. It is disturbing to 
me that Verizon Wireless would base its network management on distinctions among 
its customers’ data plans, rather than on network architecture or technology . . . . I 
know of no past Commission statement that would treat as reasonable network man-
agement a decision to slow traffic to a user who has paid, after all, for unlimited ser-
vice.95 
On October 1, 2014, the day the throttling policy was set to take effect, Ver-
izon announced the company had changed its mind, and cancelled the initia-
tive.96 Questionable practices like Verizon’s throttling policy underscore why 
FCC regulation of mobile data roaming is in the public interest. 
The Data Roaming Order, including the commercially reasonable standard, 
works to benefit consumers by increasing competition among mobile carriers.97 
Yet many mobile carriers attest that competition has stagnated or decreased 
because the commercially reasonable standard does not require national carri-
ers to provide the fair data roaming arrangements contemplated by the Data 
Roaming Order.98 Unless the Commission takes action to clarify the commer-
                                                
 94 See Kellex, Starting October 1, Verizon Will Include Unlimited 4G LTE Customers in 
“Network Optimization,” DROID LIFE (July 24, 2014), http://www.droid-
life.com/2014/07/24/verizon-network-optimization-throttling-unlimited-lte/. 
 95 Jon Brodkin, FCC Chair Accuses Verizon of Throttling Unlimited Data to Boost 
Profits, ARSTECHNICA (July 30, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/business/2014/07/fcc-chair-
accuses-verizon-of-throttling-unlimited-data-to-boost-profits/ (quoting FCC Chairman Tom 
Wheeler’s letter to Verizon Wireless CEO Daniel Mead). 
 96 See Kellex, Verizon Cancels Plans for Network Optimization of Unlimited Data Us-
ers, DROID LIFE (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.droid-life.com/2014/10/01/breaking-verizon-
cancels-plans-for-network-optimization-of-unlimited-data-users/ (citing Verizon’s state-
ment) 
We’ve greatly valued the ongoing dialogue over the past several months concerning 
network optimization and we’ve decided not to move forward with the planned im-
plementation of network optimization for 4G LTE customers on unlimited plans. 
Exceptional network service will always be our priority and we remain committed to 
working closely with industry stakeholders to manage broadband issues so that 
American consumers get the world-class mobile service they expect and value. 
Id. 
 97 See 2011 Data Roaming Order, WT Docket No. 05-265, 26 FCC Rcd 5411, at para. 
1. 
 98 See T-Mobile Data Roaming Petition, WT Docket No. 05-265, at ii (filed May 27, 
2014) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System) (“In adopting the Data 
Roaming Order, the Commission found that data roaming requirements would provide in-
centives for all carriers to invest in and deploy advanced networks, promoting competition 
among multiple providers.”); see also Reply Comments of Competitive Carrier Association, 
WT Docket No. 05-265, at 11-12; In re Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Com-
mercial Mobile Radio Service Providers and Other Providers of Mobile Data Services, 
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cially reasonable standard, mid-size carriers will not be able to secure favora-
ble roaming agreements, which will diminish their commercial viability and 
contribute to decreased competition as a whole.99 Not only does the Commis-
sion have the opportunity to benefit the public interest by clarifying the com-
mercially reasonable standard, they also have the authority established by re-
cent precedent.100 
III. CELLCO AFFIRMS THE FCC’S AUTHORITY TO CLARIFY 
COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE STANDARD 
The FCC cites Title III, Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
and ancillary jurisdiction as authority to establish the commercially reasonable 
standard for data roaming negotiations.101 Unlike roaming regulations for voice 
services in the 2007 Order, the Data Roaming Order cannot use Title II to im-
pose common carrier obligations because of a separate FCC ruling in 2007: the 
Wireless Declaratory Ruling codified mobile broadband Internet access service 
(MBIAS) as a “private mobile service” under § 332 of the Communications 
Act. 102 Section 332(c)(2) stipulates that providers of private mobile services 
“shall not . . . be treated as a common carrier for any purpose . . . .”103 Thus, in 
the Data Roaming Order the Commission had to develop a commercially rea-
sonable standard for roaming negotiations that did not breach this threshold.104 
                                                                                                             
Comments of NTCH, Inc., Flat Wireless, LLC and Buffalo-Lake Erie Wireless Systems Co., 
LLCWT Docket No. 05-265, at paras. 2-4 (filed July 10, 2014) (accessible via FCC Elec-
tronic Comment Filing System) (discussing a lack of competition for small carriers due to 
their dealing through Verizon and AT&T). 
 99 See Blevins, supra note 75, at 103 
In any event, the inability to secure favorable roaming agreements has limited, and 
will continue to limit, the competitive strength of smaller and mid-sized carriers. The 
growth of mid-sized carriers, in particular, is important given that they have the most 
potential to eventually grow into national competitors. As described above, however, 
these mid-sized carriers have been disappearing lately, and carriers’ inability to get 
more favorable roaming agreements has played an important role in their disappear-
ance. 
Id. 
 100 See Cellco P’ship v. FCC, 700 F.3d 534, 548 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 101 See 2011 Data Roaming Order, 26 FCC Rcd 5411, at para. 64. 
 102 See In the Matter of Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the 
Internet over Wireless Networks, Declaratory Ruling, WT Docket No. 07-53, at para. 39 
(Mar. 22, 2007) (accessible via FCC Electronic Filing System); see also 47 U.S.C. § 
332(c)(2) (2012). 
 103 § 332(c)(2). 
 104 See 2011 Data Roaming Order, 26 FCC Rcd. 5411, para. 68 (laying out the Commis-
sion’s data roaming agreement “commercially reasonable” standard, noting “that the data 
roaming rules [they] adopt do not amount to treating mobile data service providers as 
‘common carriers’ under the Act”). 
518 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS [Vol. 23 
The FCC’s authority to impose the resulting standard would be challenged and 
affirmed soon after its release in Cellco Partnership v. FCC. 
A. Cellco Outlines Why the FCC has Authority to Establish the Commercially 
Reasonable Standard 
In response to the release of the Data Roaming Order, Cellco (the then-
parent company of Verizon) challenged the FCC’s authority to impose a com-
mercially reasonable standard for data roaming agreements.105 Cellco fought 
the Order on two grounds: the FCC does not have the statutory authority to 
implement a commercially reasonable standard, and the commercially reason-
able standard unlawfully regulates mobile Internet providers as common carri-
ers.106 With regard to the first charge, the D.C. Circuit held that the FCC has 
three separate sources of statutory authority to implement the commercially 
reasonable standard.107 But the substantive analysis of the FCC’s authority oc-
curs during the court’s evaluation of the second challenge: whether the com-
mercially reasonable standard impermissibly treats mobile data as common 
carriage under Title II.108 
Cellco brought a facial challenge to the D.C. Circuit Court, meaning the 
commercially reasonable standard has to be upheld unless “no set of circum-
stances exists” in which it can be lawfully applied.109 In this context, the court 
found three reasons to uphold the commercially reasonable standard: (1) prop-
er deference to the Commission to interpret their own rules; (2) the obligations 
imposed do not amount to ceding control, as opposed to the public access rule 
from Midwest Video II; and (3) the commercially reasonable standard explicit-
ly allows individualized negotiations.110 
                                                
 105 See Cellco P’ship, 700 F.3d at 537. 
 106 Id. at 540. 
 107 See id. at 541. Using their spectrum management authority under Title III, the Com-
mission elected to promote access and deployment of mobile broadband service by requiring 
mobile data service providers to offer “commercially reasonable” terms when one provider 
requests to use a host provider’s facilities for commercial mobile data services. See general-
ly id. at 541-43. 
 108 Even though wireless carriers ordinarily provide their customers with voice and data 
services under a single contract, they must comply with Title II’s common carrier require-
ments only in furnishing voice service. Likewise, the Commission may invoke both its Title 
II and Title III authority to regulate mobile-voice services, but may not rely on Title II to 
regulate mobile data. Id. at 538. 
 109 Id. at 549 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). 
 110 Id. at 548. 
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1. Proper Deference to FCC 
Common carriage is characterized by a requirement for providers to offer 
their services indiscriminately and on general terms.111 However, there is no 
definitive method for ascertaining whether a given policy is so imposing as to 
qualify as a requirement “to offer services indiscriminately and on general 
terms.”112 
In order to determine whether the commercially reasonable standard violates 
the prohibition against treating mobile broadband providers as common carri-
ers, it is necessary to first define “common carrier.”113 Unfortunately, as the 
D.C. Circuit Court explains, “the [Communications] Act’s definition of ‘com-
mon carrier’ is unsatisfyingly circular,”114 because § 153 defines “common car-
rier” as “any person engaged as a common carrier for hire.”115 Courts have pre-
viously held the Commission’s interpretation of common carriage warrants 
Chevron deference.116 Yet the court may overturn the presumption that the 
Commission’s interpretation of common carriage is reasonable if the standard 
(as interpreted by the FCC) effectively relegates mobile broadband providers 
to common carrier status.117 
Rules that are not fully consistent with common carriage do not necessarily 
relegate providers to common carrier status.118 A “grey area” exists in the gap 
between what is common carriage per se and what is private carriage per se.119  
                                                
 111 See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 112 See 700 F.3d at 547 (refering to a “grey area” of common carriage and the “signifi-
cant latitude” that the Commission has in determining common carriage). 
 113 Id. at 544. 
 114 Id. at 538. 
 115 47 U.S.C. § 153(11) (2012). 
 116 See United States Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 295 F.3d 1326, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2002); 
see also Recent Cases, Telecommunications Law – Internet Regulation – D.C. Circuit Holds 
That Federal Communications Commission Violated Communications Act In Adopting 
Open Internet Rules – Verizon v. FCC, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2565, 2572 (2014) 
Under Chevron, future D.C. Circuit review of new FCC interpretations of [common 
carriage] provisions must apply canons of statutory construction to assess the rea-
sonableness of the interpretation, and to uphold any reasonable interpretation. Thus, 
a court should defer to a reasonable agency interpretation even if it is not “the read-
ing the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial pro-
ceeding,” and even if a court or the agency acknowledged statutory ambiguity and 
had previously interpreted the statute differently. 
Id. 
 117 See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 700-01 (1979). 
 118 Cellco P’ship, 700 F.3d at 547 (“[A]lthough a given regulation might be applied to 
common carriers, the obligations imposed are not common carriage per se.”). 
 119 Id. This grey area is largely due to the Commission neglecting to update its rules in 
response to new business practices and technological advancements. See Rob Frieden, Arti-
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Due to the vague statutory definition of common carriage, the Commission’s 
interpretation warrants deference if it lies anywhere within this grey area.120 
Because the FCC is granted deference, the only way the commercially rea-
sonable standard can fall outside the Commission’s authority is if it constitutes 
common carriage per se.121 And because Cellco submitted a facial challenge, 
the standard can not constitute common carriage per se unless there is no pos-
sible application of the standard that would not be common carriage per se.122 
2. Commercially Reasonable Standard Does Not Amount to Ceding Control 
Common carriage per se is not well defined, but one relevant determination 
comes from the Midwest Video cases.123 During the two challenges, the court 
determined that the “public access rule” is common carriage per se. The public 
access rule obligates cable television systems to make channels available for 
public and educational use.124 The court determined this was common carriage 
per se because it removed the cable system owner’s ability to enter individual-
ized negotiations, effectively requiring that they offer terms on an indiscrimi-
nate basis.125  In contrast, the commercially reasonable standard does “not 
amount to a duty to hold out facilities indifferently . . . for public use” because 
it expressly allows individualized negotiations.126 
                                                                                                             
cle, The Rise Of Quasi-Common Carriers and Conduit Convergence, 9 ISJLP 471, 494-95 
(2014) 
Congress has not responded to the technological and marketplace convergence that 
has occurred since the last major substantive amendment of the Communications Act 
of 1934, which took place in 1996. Congress has also not mandated mutual exclusiv-
ity in terms of regulatory oversight between a venture that offers telecommunica-
tions services and one that offers information services. Convergence all but guaran-
tees that companies will offer a diverse array of services that combine telecommuni-
cations and information services, even as a single Internet conduit can transmit them 
all. Under these changed and volatile circumstances, the FCC might make a convinc-
ing argument that it needs to revise its demarcation between regulated and unregu-
lated services. 
Id. 
 120 Cellco P’ship, 700 F.3d at 547. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 547-48. 
 123 Id. at 547. 
 124 Id. at 544-48; see Matthew Eller, Comment, The FCC and Ancillary Power: What 
Can It Truly Regulate?, 36 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 311, 326 (2014). 
 125 700 F.3d at 547-48. 
 126 Id. at 544. 
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3. Commercially Reasonable Standard Allows for Individualized Negotiations 
According to the court, the Data Roaming Order makes several material dis-
tinctions that allow for “substantial room for individualized bargaining and 
discrimination in terms.”127 A primary example identified in the decision is the 
“commercially reasonable” term itself, which by design provides greater free-
dom from agency intervention than the “just and reasonable” common carriage 
standard under Title II.128 The Commission builds significant flexibility into the 
commercially reasonable standard by specifying a case-by-case determination 
that weighs sixteen explicit factors, as well as the totality of circumstances.129 
The D.C. Circuit Court ruled that, barring further clarification from the 
FCC, the commercially reasonable standard as formulated in the Data Roam-
ing Order merely obligates host providers to offer requesting providers some 
version of a data roaming agreement.130 The FCC may choose to interpret the 
commercially reasonable standard as imposing more stringent obligations on 
data roaming agreements;131 however, until the FCC establishes regulations that 
breach the common carriage threshold, the FCC retains the authority to enforce 
commercially reasonable data roaming negotiations.132 
B. The FCC Can Clarify Commercially Reasonable Standard in Accordance 
With Cellco 
The Commission has the authority to clarify the commercially reasonable 
standard, and effect meaningful change in the data roaming marketplace.133 
According to the Cellco decision, the FCC has broad discretion to determine 
whether the commercially reasonable standard qualifies as common carriage, 
unless that interpretation is so unreasonable that the rules employed constitute 
common carriage per se.134 However, the Commission has yet to expand the 
                                                
 127 Id. at 548. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. (sixteen factors for evaluating under commercially reasonable standard); see 2011 
Data Roaming Order, WT Docket No. 05-265, 26 FCC Rcd. 5411, para. 86 (listing the six-
teen factors used in a case-by-case determination). 
 130 Cellco P’ship, 700 F.3d at 548. 
 131 Id. at 550. 
 132 Id. at 549. 
 133 Id. at 541-42; Lawrence R. Freedman, D.C. Circuit affirms FCC’s data roaming rule, 
AIPLA NEWSTAND (Dec. 6, 2012), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c8d9ab8c-254b-448a-9cd4-34781851a920. 
 134 Cellco P’ship, 700 F.3d at 547. 
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commercially reasonable standard to impose regulations any more stringent 
than the original ineffective formulation.135 
IV. T-MOBILE BENCHMARKS CAN IMPROVE COMMERCIALLY 
REASONABLE STANDARD WITHOUT VIOLATING COMMON 
CARRIAGE LIMITS 
On May 27, 2014, three years after the Commission released the Data 
Roaming Order, T-Mobile filed a petition seeking FCC clarification of obliga-
tions imposed by the commercially reasonable standard.136 According to T-
Mobile’s Petition, the commercially reasonable standard should be based on 
predictable criteria so carriers know whether the terms of an agreement are 
commercially reasonable.137 The Petition proposes using “price benchmarks” to 
help clarify the commercially reasonable standard.138 
A. T-Mobile’s Benchmarks Can Show Contrasting Rates For Similar Services 
T-Mobile does not suggest that price benchmarks provide mathematically 
precise, prescriptive regulation of data roaming rates.139 Instead, price bench-
marks serve as non-binding guideposts that give carriers a general idea of what 
rates and terms will be designated as commercially reasonable.140 
1. Retail Benchmark 
T-Mobile believes that “a natural benchmark for wholesale mobile data 
prices is retail mobile data pricing.”141 According to the petition, some provid-
ers artificially inflate the price of wholesale mobile data service in order to 
                                                
 135 See generally Robert Margetta, FCC, Congress Gear Up for Net Neutrality Next 
Steps, ROLL CALL (Jan.12, 2015, 2:05 PM), 
http://www.rollcall.com/news/fcc_congress_gear_up_for_net_neutrality_next_steps-
239194-1.html (showing debate concerning “commercially reasonable standard” still con-
tinues in 2015). 
 136 T-Mobile Data Roaming Petition, WT Docket No. 05-265, at i. 
 137 Id. at 11. 
 138 Id. at 12. 
 139 Id. at 27. 
 140 Id. 
 141 The proposed benchmarks are derived from the price of providing services similar to 
data roaming, but in a different competitive context. They contrast the cost requesting pro-
viders pay for data roaming to rates charged by host providers for: (1) retail data services; 
(2) data roaming for foreign carriers; (3) data roaming for Mobile Virtual Network Opera-
tors (MVNOs); and (4) data roaming for requesting providers of similar size. Id. at 12. 
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raise operating costs for the requesting provider.142 Large host providers, like 
AT&T, have the resources to unfairly influence data roaming agreements. 
Such agreements require requesting providers to buy wholesale mobile data 
service at a price “many orders of magnitude” greater than the rate the host 
provider charges their own customers for purchasing far less data on a retail 
basis.143 
T-Mobile argues that AT&T charges outrageous rates for wholesale mobile 
data services so that costs increase for its competitors, forcing them to either 
raise their prices or reduce their quality of service.144 Such anti-competitive 
conduct should be prohibited under a “commercially reasonable” standard.145 
While it is conceivable some rare circumstances could justify charging compa-
rable rates for wholesale and retail mobile data service, T-Mobile believes 
breaching this threshold can be indicative of anti-competitive behavior, making 
it a useful guidepost for evaluating a commercially reasonable standard.146 
2. Rates Charged to Foreign Carriers 
Mobile data roaming agreements between domestic and foreign carriers that 
have no affiliation are useful tools of comparison because they reveal alternate 
competitive motives when compared to other data roaming negotiations.147 T-
Mobile claims that foreign carriers acquire reasonable data roaming rates be-
cause the numerous options for roaming partners helps to foster honest compe-
tition.148 Also, because the two contracting providers operate in different coun-
tries and have entirely separate customer bases, there is no incentive to in-
crease operating costs for the other provider by artificially inflating wholesale 
data roaming rates.149 Removing the anti-competitive bias makes this a helpful 
guidepost because it is more likely to reveal the fair-market value of data 
roaming service.150 
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3. Rates Charged to MVNOs 
MVNOs are mobile service providers that do not have any infrastructure of 
their own.151 Instead, MVNOs enter agreements with providers to allow the 
MVNOs’ customers to use the host provider’s facilities on a primary basis.152 
MVNO subscribers are, in a sense, permanently roaming.153 From a technical 
perspective, providing mobile data service for an MVNO should not be any 
more or less expensive than providing the same service for a small requesting 
provider.154 MVNOs and requesting providers are both purchasing data roam-
ing service at a wholesale rate; however, MVNOs often receive far lower rates 
because of coinciding business interests with the host provider.155 According to 
T-Mobile, the requesting provider is forced to pay a premium for the same ser-
vice because host providers artificially inflate prices in order to gain a competi-
tive advantage.156 
4. Rates Charged by Other Carriers 
Analyzing the data roaming rates charged by providers can be a useful way 
to identify a carrier with consistently inflated rates.157 However the benchmark 
could be fundamentally flawed because it presumes the most common rates 
and terms are indicative of commercial reasonability.158 Because carriers are 
often leveraged into disadvantageous roaming agreements with larger host 
providers, even a large sample of data roaming rates could be skewed.159 
B. Some Benchmarks Will Provide Meaningful Insight to Commercially 
Reasonable Terms for Data Roaming 
Two of T-Mobile’s benchmarks, the retail and MVNO benchmarks, are 
simple enough to provide real guidance to mobile broadband providers.160 The 
retail benchmark is an effective barometer for commercially unreasonable con-
duct because wholesale data roaming service should not cost significantly 
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more than the retail rate.161 MVNO rates may also prove to be a beneficial 
comparison because, from a technical standpoint, providing data roaming ser-
vice for MVNOs is similar to providing the same service to smaller, requesting 
carriers.162 
However, T-Mobile’s foreign carrier rate and “other domestic carriers” rate 
contain too many variables to liken to commercially reasonable data roaming 
rates.163 Using the rates charged by other domestic carriers to determine what is 
commercially reasonable is a mistake because it equates “popular” or “com-
mon” with “reasonable,” without justifying the correlation.164 It seemingly in-
centivizes collusion among providers rather than competition because incum-
bents could use artificially high prices from past agreements to rationalize arti-
ficially high prices in the future.165 
T-Mobile’s Petition received resounding support from other carriers.166 With 
the notable exceptions of Verizon and AT&T, all commenters denounce the 
current wholesale data roaming market and support FCC clarification of the 
commercially reasonable standard.167 
To remain within the boundaries of Cellco, proposals for clarifying the 
commercially reasonable standard cannot impose regulations that qualify as 
common carriage per se, which requires a carrier to offer service indiscrimi-
nately and on general terms.168 The T-Mobile proposal should be well outside 
the realm of per se common carriage because T-Mobile does not advocate us-
ing any benchmark to single-handedly determine what is or is not commercial-
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ly reasonable.169 T-Mobile envisions retaining the considerable flexibility of the 
current regulatory regime by using benchmarks as additional factors to be con-
sidered when determining commercial reasonableness.170 
Mobile providers currently have no meaningful guidance for abiding by the 
commercially reasonable standard.171 If just a single benchmark is established 
as an “upper boundary” to the commercially reasonable standard, providers 
will have a better idea when it is appropriate to seek dispute resolution with the 
FCC. The Commission could face a legal challenge if they clarify the commer-
cially reasonable standard, but Cellco stipulates that the FCC has the authority 
to do so.172 
V. MOBILE DATA ROAMING POST-NET NEUTRALITY ORDER 
On February 26, 2015, the Commission voted to adopt the Report and Order 
on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order in the Matter of Protecting and 
Promoting the Open Internet.173 Fixed and mobile broadband service will be 
reclassified to impose certain Title II provisions on carriers.174 The FCC will 
issue a letter of inquiry regarding how these new classifications should affect 
mobile data roaming obligations, but notes the current rules remain in effect 
until the Commission completes another full rulemaking procedure.175 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Data Roaming Order fails because the “commercially reasonable” 
standard is too vague to impose meaningful regulations.176 The standard was 
developed to impose requirements wholly distinct from common carriage obli-
gations under Title II of the Communications Act.177 The number of factors 
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used to evaluate the commercially reasonable standard, coupled with the flexi-
bility to weigh those factors on a case-by-case basis under the totality of the 
circumstances, was adequate for withstanding a Title II challenge.178 However, 
its endless possible applications fail to yield meaningful guidance as to what is 
actually prohibited by the standard.179 
When the D.C. Circuit Court upheld the legality of the commercially rea-
sonable standard in Cellco v. FCC, the court ruled that the Commission may 
interpret “commercially reasonable” as they see fit, so long as their interpreta-
tion falls short of per se common carriage under Title II.180 The FCC chose to 
go beyond clarifying the commercially reasonable standard in the Net Neutrali-
ty Order by effectively reclassifying mobile broadband service as an intercon-
nected service subject to the same common carriage roaming obligations as 
voice telephony services in the 2007 Order. However, until the Commission 
establishes a new data roaming regime reflecting the reclassification of mobile 
broadband, the current framework will remain in effect and the issues harming 
the mobile industry will persist. 
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